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TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
by
Ernest E. Figari,Jr. *

M

AJOR developments in the field of civil procedure during the survey
period include judicial decisions, statutory enactments,' and two sets
of amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 This survey examines these developments and considers their impact on existing Texas
procedure.
I.

JURISDICTION OF THE PERSON

During the survey period several courts considered the availability of outof-state service of process under article 2031b3 the Texas long-arm statute.
Section 3 of article 2031b authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a
nonresident when he "engages in business" in Texas. 4 "Doing business," as
defined in section 4, includes "entering into contract by mail or otherwise
with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part. . . in this State
or the committing of any tort in whole or in part in this State." 5 While
service under article 2031b apparently depends on actionable conduct in the
state, Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp. ,6 a recent decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, indicates that the defendant's location may be more important in supporting personal jurisdiction than the
place of the conduct giving rise to the cause of action. The plaintiff, an El
Paso horse trainer, brought suit in Texas against the operator of the adjacent
Sunland Park race track which was located in New Mexico. Claiming that
the defendant had refused to provide stalls at Sunland Park for horses the
plaintiff had trained and that this conduct was in violation of a rule of the
New Mexico Racing Commission, the plaintiff sought recovery for the loss
of his training business. Conceding that the defendant had committed no act
in Texas which gave rise to the cause of action, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless reversed the trial court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Stressing that the race track was nearer El Paso than any urban center in
New Mexico and that the defendant regularly solicited customers from El
Paso to attend and gamble on its races, the court concluded that article 2031b
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
I. The enactments which have procedural implications principally concern limitations,
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5539d (Vernon Supp. '1978); venue, id. arts. 1995(6), (9a), and
art. 2390; and recovery of attorney's fees, id. arts. 1293b, 2226, and art. 5523b, §§ 1, 2.
2. The first amendment was confined to TEX. R. Civ. P. 42, which governs class action
procedure, and became effective Sept. 1, 1977. See Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 40 TEX.
B.J. 563 (1977). As a result of the second amendment, 40 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were
modified, 10 new rules were added, and 5 rules were repealed. These changes became effective
Jan. 1, 1978. See Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 40 TEX. B.J. 709 (1977).
3. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
4. Id.§ 3; see note 18 infra.
5. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 4 (Vernon 1964).
6. 554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1977).
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was satisfied when7 the claim arose from the defendant's "general endeavors" in Texas.
U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt8 is an indication that the Texas Supreme Court has a more restrictive view of the due process requirements of
nonresident service than the federal appellate courts. The plaintiff, a Texas
advertising firm, brought suit in Texas against an Oklahoma resident to
collect sums due under a written contract. Service was effected by means of
article 2031b. The contract was solicited in Oklahoma by the plaintiff and
was executed by both parties in that state. With respect to performance, the
contract required the plaintiff to erect five advertising displays at specified
locations in Oklahoma and obligated the defendant to send payment to the
plaintiff's offices in Amarillo. The defendant mailed six checks to Amarillo,
but he had no other contacts with Texas. Observing that the question
presented was solely one of due process, 9 the court concluded that the
defendant's contacts with Texas did not satisfy federal constitutional requirements, and, therefore, affirmed the trial court's dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction.1" Since the outcome in U-Anchor turned on a federal
question, however, the decision should be considered in light of federal
cases sustaining nonresident service in analogous situations."1 More in line
with the federal decisions and somewhat contrary to the rationale of UAnchor is Gubitosi v. Buddy Schoellkopf Products,Inc. 12The plaintiffs filed
suit against the defendant, a New York resident, on his two written guaranties insuring payment of certain indebtedness to the plaintiffs in "Dallas,
Texas." The guaranties were signed by the defendant in New York, and
were mailed from there to the plaintiffs in Texas. With the exception of the
foregoing the defendant had no other contacts with Texas. Nevertheless,
finding the guaranties payable in Texas to be the critical fact, the court of
civil appeals held that due process was satisfied and sustained service on the
defendant under.article 2031b. 13
7. Id. at 749.
8. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977).
9. The court had concluded previously that the defendant was "doing business" in Texas
within the meaning of the long-arm statute. The court, however, implied that analysis under art.
2031b is unnecessary because "art. 2031b reaches as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit." Id. at 702.
10. Reference should also be made to the court's brief discussion of TEX. R. Civ. P. 108. In
a footnote the court made the following statement after noting the rule: "[W]e stated the
purpose of the amendment [to rule 108] is to permit acquisition of in personam jurisdiction to
the constitutional limits." 553 S.W.2d at462 n. 1. Although the rule had no bearing on the case
at hand, this dictum may be a suggestion by the Texas Supreme Court that rule 108 is an
alternate means to art. 2031b of acquiring personal jurisdiction.
II. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Gubitosi v. Buddy Schoellkopf
Prod., Inc., 545 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ); National Truckers Serv.,
Inc. v. Aero Sys., Inc., 480 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Consolidated Carpet Corp., 547 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
12. 545 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
13. Id. at 534-36; accord, National Truckers Serv., Inc. v. Aero Sys., Inc., 480 S.W.2d 455
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McKanna v. Edgar, 380 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965). Declaring what
had been hesitatingly suggested in earlier cases, one court recently proclaimed that
"U]urisdiction on the basis ot'a single act in the forum state has been uniformly upheld."
Arterbury v. American Bank & Trust Co., 553 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1977, no writ).
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A curious set of jurisdictional events was considered in DLJProperties/73
v. Eastern Savings Bank.14 A Texas resident and a New York bank entered

into a contract substantially performable by both parties in Texas. Prior to
the bank's failure to fulfill its contractual obligations, the Texas resident
assigned his rights under the contract to the plaintiff, a New York partnership. The plaintiff filed suit in Texas against the bank for breach of the

contract and effected service under article 2031b. Acknowledging that "doing business" by entering into a contract performable in Texas requires as
an element that one of the contracting parties be a "resident of Texas,"' 5 the

court of civil appeals held that the assignment of the contract by the Texas
resident to a 16
nonresident did not remove the transaction from the scope of

article 2031b.
Generally, a plaintiff must allege facts in his petition showing that he is
entitled to resort to substituted service under a particular statute.17 In order

to effect service under article 2031b, the prevailing rule is that a petition must
allege that the nonresident defendant "does not maintain a place of regular

business in this State or a designated agent upon whom service may be
made."" Adding to the list of required allegations for service under article
2031b, the court in Gathers v. Walpace Co. '9found deficient a petition which
failed to state "that the cause of action

. . .

asserted arose from or was in

any manner connected with defendant's purposeful acts in this state." 2
Furthermore, according to Gourmet, Inc. v. Hurley,2' service issued under
article 2031b on the basis of a petition which omitted the required allegations
could not thereafter be cured through the filing of an amended petition prior

to default judgment2322 or through the introduction of sufficient evidence at
the default hearing.

14. 549 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no writ).
15. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 4 (Vernon 1964).
16. 549 S.W.2d at 756.
17. See, e.g., McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965); Flynt v. City of Kingsville,
125 Tex. 510, 82 S.W.2d 934 (1935); Gianelle v. Morgan, 514 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1974, no writ).
18. See McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965). TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
2031b, § 3 (Vernon 1964) provides that:
Any foreign corporation, association, joint stock company, partnership, or nonresident natural person that engages in business in this State, . . .and [1] does not
maintain a place of regular business in this State or [2] a designated agent upon
whom service may be made upon causes of action arising out of such business
done in this State, the act or acts of engaging in such business within this State
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment . . . of the Secretary of State of
Texas as agent upon whom service of process may be made in any action, suit or
proceedings arising out of such business done in this State ....
19. 544 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20. Id.The court derived this new requirement from the jurisdictional test of O'Brien v.
Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966). At least two questions remain open after this
decision: (I) whether the other prongs of the O'Brien test must be alleged in order to sustain
jurisdiction under art. 203 lb, and (2) whether the pleader has lost his right of amendment if the
opposing party uses the special appearance attack under rule 120a instead of a special excep-.
tion.
21. 552 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
22. Id. at 512-13.
23. Id.; accord, Burgess v. Ancillary Acceptance Corp., 543 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). .
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II. JURISDICTION OVER PROPERTY
Of great importance to in rem jurisdiction 24 is the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner.25 Under consideration in Shaffer was a Delaware statute which, by authorizing the seizure of a nonresident's property located within the state, compelled the personal appearance
of the nonresident to defend an action brought against him. Historically, in
rem jurisdiction has been based on attachment or seizure of property present in the forum state, not on contacts between the defendant and the
forum state. Observing that "[t]he fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction
over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of

the property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification," 26 the Supreme Court concluded "that all assertions of state court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny." 27 Thus, a state seeking to assert jurisdiction
over the interest of a nonresident in property located within its territory may
only do so on the basis of "minimum contacts" between the nonresident and
the state.

28

III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Rule 106 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 which provides for
service of citation, was amended to authorize service upon a defendant by
"the officer's mailing by registered or certified mail, with delivery restricted
to addressee only, a true copy of the citation and with a copy of the petition
attached thereto."130 Furthermore, amended rule 107 stipulates that "[w]hen
the citation was served by registered or certified mail . . . the return by the
officer must also contain the return receipt with the addressee's signature.""
IV.

VENUE

Subdivision 5 of article 199532 provides an exception to exclusive venue in
24. The traditional distinction between the various theories of jurisdiction is explained by
the following statement:
If a court's jurisdiction is based on its authority over the defendant's person, the
action and judgment are denominated 'in personam' and can impose a personal
obligation on the defendant in favor of the plaintiff. If jurisdiction is based on the
court's power over property within its territory, the action is called 'in rem' or
'quasi in rem.' The effect of a judgment in such a case is limited to the property
that supports jurisdiction and does not impose a personal liability on the property
owner, since he is not before the court.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2577, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683, 694 (1977).
25. Id. at 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 683.
26. Id. at 2584, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 703.
27. Id. at 2584-85, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 703. The reference is to the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 336 U.S. 310 (1945).
28. The Court acknowledged that its decision would result in a more significant change in
practice with respect to quasi in rem actions as opposed to true in rem proceedings. 97 S. Ct. at
2582-83, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 700-01.
29. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106.
30. Rule 106 was also amended to provide that where service in person or by registered or
certified mail is not practical the trial court, upon motion, may authorize service "by any
disinterested adult named by the court in its order." Id.
31. Id. 107.
32. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978). This statute provides
that a person may be sued in the county expressly named in a contract as the place of
performance, subject to subd. 5(b) dealing with consumer transactions.
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a defendant's county of residence if the defendant has contracted in writing
to perform an obligation in another county. Resolving a conflict in the
decisions of the courts of civil appeals,33 the Texas Supreme Court in
Hopkins v. FirstNational Bank 34 gave a liberal interpretation to subdivision
5 in determining the proper venue of a suit brought on a written guaranty
which did not specify the place of payment. Since the note covered by the
guaranty provided for payment in the county of suit, the court reasoned that
the guaranty incorporated this payment provision for venue purposes and
sustained the application of subdivision 5. This subdivision was also examined in Loomis v. Blacklands ProductionCreditAss 'n 35 which involved a
suit on a note payable " 'in the city in Texas in which said Association's
principal office is located.' ",36 Noting the evidence established that the
location of the principal office was in the county of suit, the court concluded
that "where a contract names or identifies a definite place for performance,
extraneous proof is proper to establish the county in which the place is
37
located."
38
Aimed at eliminating distant forum abuses in consumer transactions,
subdivision 5(b) of article 199539 was added in 1973. This subdivision provides that in an action upon a contract arising out of a "consumer transaction," suit by a creditor upon the contract may be brought against the
defendant either in the county in which the defendant signed the contract or
in the county in which the defendant resided at the time of the commencement of the action. Cases interpreting subdivision 5(b) include Ingram v.
D.C. Rachal Ford, Inc.4 and Beef Cattle Co. v. N.K. Parrish, Inc. 41 In
Ingram a "consumer transaction" was held to encompass a contract for
the repair of a personal automobile. Similarly, in Beef Cattle Co. the purchase by a corporation of feed to be used in a ranching operation was held to
be a "consumer transaction."
Subdivision 6 of article 1995,42 which governs the venue of an action
against a personal representative, provides that a suit against a personal
representative to establish a money demand against the estate he represents
may be brought in the county in which the estate is administered. Further33. Compare Bridewell Dev. Corp. v. American Gen. Inv. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ), Hopkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 546 S.W.2d 84
(Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1976), writ ref'd n.r.e., 551 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1977), Rost v.
First Nat'l Bank, 472 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971, no writ), Laukhuf v.
Associates Discount Corp., 443 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ), Carter v.
Texas State Bank, 189 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1945, no writ), and Cullum v.
Commercial Credit Co., 134 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1939, no writ), with Smith
v. First Nat'l Bank, 146 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1940, no writ).
34. 551 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1977), refusing applicationfor writ of error, n.r.e., 546 S.W.2d 84
(Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1976).
35. 552 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, no writ).
36. Id. at 572.
37. Id.; accord, Bruce Campbell & Son Constr. Co. v. Britton Drive, Inc., 527 S.W.2d 852
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
38. See Sampson, Distant Forum Abuse in Consumer Transactions:A ProposedSolution,
51 TEXAS L. REV. 269 (1973).
39. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
40. 545 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ dism'd).
41. 553 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
42. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(6) (Vernon Supp. 1978); see id. art. 1995(9a).
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more, as a result of a recent amendment, subdivision 6 now authorizes suit
against an executor, administrator, or guardian "growing out of a negligent
act or omission," of the person whose estate is being represented, to be
brought in the county "where the negligent act or omission . . . oc-

curred. " 4 3 Another enactment in the area of venue was the amendment of
article 2390," which provides for venue of civil actions in the justice court.
As a result of this legislation, the venue provisions governing the justice
45
courts are now similar to those of article 1995.
The venue treatment of a national bank was the subject of Houston
National Bank v. Farris.6 The federal statute which governs the venue of a
suit against a national banking association provides that "[a]ctions and
proceedings against any association.

. .

may be had.

. .

in any State...

court in the county or city in which said association is located." 47 The
statute usually has been interpreted to require that a suit against a national
bank must be brought in the county of its domicile." According to an early
case,4 9 however, "local" actions are excluded from the application of the
statute. Focusing on this exception, the Amarillo court of civil appeals held
that an action against a national bank for improper drainage of mineral
property was "local" in nature and therefore exempted from the federal
statute

0

The venue of an action under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act is governed by section 17.56.5' This section provides that an action brought under the Act "may be commenced in the
county in which the person against whom the suit is brought resides, has his
principal place of business or is doing business." ' 52 Construing section 17.56
for the first time, two cases 53 during the survey period held that in establishing venue of a claim seeking redress for a deceptive trade practice a plaintiff
must plead and prove a cause of action under the Act.
Determining the proper venue of an ancillary claim was an issue which
also received attention during the survey period. Section 2(g) of the Texas
comparative negligence statute,5 4 which provides that "[a]ll claims for contribution between the named defendants in the primary suit shall be determined in the primary suit," was recently construed. Joining with two earlier
cases, 5 Winningham v. Connor5 6 held that section 2(g) is a mandatory venue
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. art. 1995(6).
Id. art. 2390.
See id. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964).
549 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ dism'd).
12 U.S.C. § 94 (1970).
See, e.g., Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
Casey v. Adams, 103 U.S. 66 (1880).
549 S.W.2d at 422.

51.

TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.56 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

52. Id.
53. Hudson & Hudson Realtor v. Savage, 545 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no
writ); Doyle v. Grady, 543 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
54. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
55. LaSorsa v. Burr, 516 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ);
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Edwards, 512 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no
writ).
56. 552 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, no writ).
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provision 57 and that when a crossclaim for contribution is asserted between
named defendants, the crossclaim is to be tried in the county where the
court hearing the main suit is situated.58
Nacol v. Williams 59 emphasizes the danger of taking any action inconsistent with the assertion of a plea of privilege. At the time of filing his plea of
privilege, the defendant submitted a motion to rule for costs and a proposed
order granting such motion. The trial court entered the order and required
the plaintiff to post a cash deposit. Following a subsequent hearing on the
plea of privilege, which was contested by the plaintiff, the trial court
overruled the plea. Affirming the ruling of the trial court, the court of civil
appeals concluded that the defendant had waived his plea of privilege by
invoking the general jurisdiction of the trial court on his motion to rule for
costs .6
V.

PLEADINGS

The most significant development in the area of pleadings came in the
form of a recent amendment to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4761
now provides that "[a]n original pleading which sets forth a claim for relief
• . . shall contain . . . in all claims for unliquidated 62 damages only the
statement that the damages sought exceed the minimum jurisdictional limits
of the court." The purpose of the amendment was apparently to prohibit
allegations of exaggerated damages of a nature which tend to result in
adverse publicity to defendants. "Upon special exception," however, rule
47 directs the trial court to "require the pleader to amend so as to specify the
maximum amount claimed." One further amendment in this area should be
noted by the trial practitioner. Rule 72, which now makes a certificate of
service mandatory, provides that counsel "shall certify . . . on the filed

pleading in writing over his personal signature" that he has served upon the
63
adverse party any pleading, plea, or motion filed with the court.
The sworn denial required of a defendant who seeks to avoid the evidentiary effect of a sworn account was the subject of considerable appellate
attention. Rule 185 provides that a suit on sworn account "shall be taken as
prima facie evidence thereof, unless the party resisting such claim shall...
file a written denial, under oath, stating [1] that each and every item is not
just or true, or [2] that some specified item or items are not just and true.""6
Interpreting the wording of rule 185 strictly, the court in Sigler v. Frost
Brothers, Inc. 65 found that a sworn denial stating that "the account which is
57. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(30) (Vernon 1964).
58. 552 S.W.2d at 583.
59. 554 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ dism'd).
60. Id. at 288; accord, Barrett v. Cheatham, 281 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1955,
no writ).
61.

TEX. R. Civ. P. 47 (emphasis added).

62. The word "unliquidated" can be defined only by examining the context in which it is
used. At present no clear definition exists with respect to the use of the term at the pleading
stage. For a definition of "liquidated claim" in the default judgment context see Freeman v.
Leasing Ass'n, 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ) (a
claim is liquidated if the amount claimed as damages can be accurately calculated by the court,
or under its direction, from the allegations contained in the plaintiff's petition and an instrument
in writing upon which the claim is based).
63. TEX. R. Civ. P. 72.

64. Id. 185.
65. 555 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
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the foundation of the Plaintiff's action is not just or true in part" was

deficient. 66 "If a defendant's sworn denial is levelled at only some specified
item or items," concluded the court, "he must state that 'some specified
item or items are not just and true.' ",67 Additionally, the court in Dixon v.
Mayfield Building Supply Co. 68 held that an acknowledgment of a denial
contained in the defendant's answer to a suit on a sworn account was
insufficient because rule 185 requires that the account be denied "under
oath."
VI.

LIMITATIONS

The discovery rule, which is applicable to limited types of actions, 69
establishes that the pertinent statute of limitations will not commence to run
until the discovery of the true facts giving rise to the claimed damage or until
the date discovery should reasonably have been made. 70 In a sharply divided
opinion the supreme court in Robinson v. Weaver 7 refused to extend the
discovery rule to the statute of limitations in a malpractice action against a
physician who had misdiagnosed the condition of the plaintiff. The supreme
court reasoned that a claim of misdiagnosis, unlike the situation where a
foreign object is left in the body of a patient, rests solely upon testimonial
evidence and entails the corresponding danger of being a fraudulent claim.
Since the primary purpose of limitations is to prevent litigation of stale or
fraudulent claims, the court declined to apply the discovery rule to encompass a claim of misdiagnosis. In contrast, the court of civil appeals in
Fitzpatrick v. Marlowe72 applied the discovery rule to the negligent treatment by a physician of the plaintiff's nasal condition.
Although a conflict arose among the courts of civil appeals with respect to
the placement of the burden of proof in discovery rule cases, 73 the supreme
court has apparently put the controversy to rest by its decision in Weaver v.
Witt.74 In the context of a motion for summary judgment the court held that
66. Id. at 816.
67. Id. (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 185).
68. 543 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).

69. See, e.g., Thrift v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (breach of
warranty by drug manufacturer); Kelley v. Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. 1976), noted in 30 Sw.
L.J. 950 (1976) (submission of false credit report by creditor); Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412
(Tex. 1972) (unsuccessful vasectomy by physician); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.
1967) (foreign object left in body by surgeon); Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967)
(negligent preparation of tax return by accountant); Armstrong v. Morgan, 545 S.W.2d 45 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ) (transmission of libelous communication); Grady v.
Faykus, 530 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (negligent
administration of x-ray therapy). See also Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice, 11
Hous. L. REV. 825, 839 (1974); Note, Limitations of Actions, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 199 (1967).
70. See, e.g., Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. 1972) ("the Statute of Limitations
commences to run on the date of the discovery of the true facts. . . or from the date it should,
in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have been discovered"); Gaddis v. Smith, 417
S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. 1967) ("the cause of action accrues when the injury becomes apparent,
or should have been discovered by due diligence on the part of the party affected by it").
71. 550 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1977) (5-4 decision).
72. 553 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. Compare Weaver v. Witt, 552 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1977), rev'd per curiam, 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 68 (Nov. 19, 1977), with Whatley v. National Bank
of Commerce, 555 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ), and Weaver v. Robinson, 536 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 550 S.W.2d
18 (Tex. 1977).
74. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 68 (Nov. 19, 1977), rev'g per curiam 552 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977).
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"the rule is not a plea of confession and avoidance" and, therefore, the
defendant movant has the burden of negating "the pleading of the discovery
rule by proving as a matter of law that there was no genuine issue of fact
concerning the time when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered
the nature of the injury. 7 5 According to the court, however, proof of facts
of the party
suspending the operation of a statute of limitations is the burden
76
pleading suspension in a conventional trial on the merits.
City of Port Arthur v. Bowling, 77 involving an action brought by certain
homeowners against a city to recover for damage to their property caused by
odors escaping from a nearby sewer line, is a case of first impression.
Conceding that the homeowners' allegations, if proved, would amount to a
constitutional taking 78 of property by the city, the court was faced with a
choice of applying the two-year 79 or ten-year 0 statute of limitations to the
plaintiffs' claim. Distinguishing the situation from one in which there has
been a taking of property by physical invasion, governed by the ten-year
statute of limitations, 81 the court found the case to be more analogous to a
nuisance action and, consequently, controlled by the two-year statute of

limitations .82
Finally, article 5539d, a recent enactment in the limitations area, provides
that "[i]f the last day of a limitations period under any statute of limitations
falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the period for filing suit is extended
to the next day that the offices of the county are open for business."8 3
VII. PARTIES
The most significant development in the area of parties was the amendment of rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 84 Abandoning its
former class action procedures, Texas adopted, with few changes, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23,85 which governs class actions in federal court.
Thus, the new rule now defines the permitted classes in terms of functions
to be served rather than rights to be litigated as under the old rule, and
makes substantial changes to prior practice with respect to notice requirements and the binding effect of a class action judgment.16 Unlike its federal
of
counterpart, however, rule 42 expressly provides that unnamed members
87
a class are not to be considered as parties for purposes of discovery.
75. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 68.

76. Id. at n.2.
77. 551 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ filed) (2-1 decision).
78. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17. This article, which is the basis for an action for constitutional
taking, provides that "[n]o persons's property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or
"
applied to public use without adequate compensation being made ....
79. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(1) (Vernon 1958) (applicable to an action for
"injury done to the estate or the property of another").
against another
80. Id. art. 5510 (applicable to an action for the "recovery of lands ...
having peaceable and adverse possession thereof").
81. See Brazos River Auth. v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 354 S.W.2d 99 (1961).
82. 551 S.W.2d at 157.
83. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5539d (Vernon Supp. 1978).

84. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
86. See Jaworski & Padgett, The Class Action in Texas: An Examination and a Proposal,
12 Hous. L. REV. 1005 (1975).
87. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(f).
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Disapproving a contrary holding in an earlier case,8 8 the Texas Supreme
Court in Clear Lake City Water Authority v. Clear Lake Utilities Co.89
concluded that the liberal joinder procedure of rule 39o is not inconsistent
with the joinder requirements of the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act. 9 1 The court reiterated that the joinder provision of the Act, 92 which
stipulates that all parties whose interests will be affected by the declaratory
judgment "shall be made parties" to the action, is mandatory. Applying the
liberal joinder procedure of rule 39 to an action brought under the Act, the
court nevertheless concluded that noncompliance with the provision did not
93
uniformly constitute a jurisdictional defect.
Two cases which may be of interest to the trust and estate practitioner are
Moore v. Allen' and Pampell v. Pampell.95 Article 4412a, 96 which pertains to
actions affecting a charitable trust, was considered in Moore. Observing
that article 4412a mandates the joinder of the attorney general of Texas as a
party in suits of this nature, 97 the court set aside a judgment construing
testamentary instruments creating a charitable trust entered in a suit to
which the attorney general of Texas was not a party. 98 The conclusion of the
court in Pampell was that all beneficiaries under a will are indispensable
99
parties to an action to construe the will or to partition the estate.

VIII.

DISCOVERY

02
Barker v. Dunham'00provides an interpretation of rules 167101 and 186a'
which authorize the discovery of the reports and opinion testimony of an
expert. In a suit to recover damages arising from the failure of a crane boom
manufactured by the defendant, the plaintiff filed a motion for production of
tangible items and attempted to depose an engineer in the regular employment of the defendant; both procedures focused on the findings and opinions of the engineer. The trial court sustained the defendant's objection to
the attempted discovery on the grounds that the rules limit discovery to
experts who are both engaged for consultation and will be called as witnesses. In the ensuing mandamus proceeding103 the Texas Supreme Court
approved the attempted discovery, concluding that "[tihe rules draw no
distinction between an expert who is a regular employee and one who is

88. Crickmer v. King, 507 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).
89. 549 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1977).
90. TEX. R. Civ. P. 39.
91. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (Vernon 1965).

92. Id. § ii.
93. 549 S.W.2d at 389-90.
94. 544 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, no writ).
95. 554 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ).
96. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4412a (Vernon 1976).
97. Id. § 2.
98. 544 S.W.2d at 451-52.
99. 554 S.W.2d at 21.
100. 551 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977).
101. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167. See generally Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Cunningham, 502 S.W.2d
544 (Tex. 1973), noted in 28 Sw. L.J. 617 (1974).
102. TEX. R. Civ. P. 186a.
103. Significantly, this case removes any doubts which may have existed regarding the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of mandamus for a denial of a motion for discovery as
opposed to a trial court's order which allows discovery. The court will apparently apply the
"clear abuse of discretion" standard in both instances. 551 S.W.2d at 42.
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temporarily employed to aid in the preparation of a claim or defense."'"
Furthermore, having placed the burden of disclaiming use of the expert as a
witness upon the party resisting the discovery, the court stated that
"[w]here a party does not positively aver that the expert in question will be
'used solely for consultation' and will not be called as a witness at the trial,
the policy of allowing broad discovery in civil cases is furthered by permitting discovery of that expert's reports, factual observations, and opinions."1 05
Two additional cases decided by the supreme court involve the proper
scope of discovery in light of specific statutes dealing with the subject
matter sought to be discovered. Article 4447d, which confines discovery of
hospital records to those "records made or maintained in the regular course
of business of a hospital,"'06 was interpreted in Texarkana Medical Hospital
v. Jones. 7 Denying a discovery request for the minutes of certain hospital
committee and board of directors meetings, the court held that "records
made or maintained in the regular course of business of a hospital" were
limited to those records kept in connection with the treatment of the individual patients and the administrative files apart from committee deliberations.'10 Similarly, Ex parte Pruitt,"° an action on a fire insurance policy,
concerned the discoverability of certain investigatory records of a county
fire marshal made confidential by article 1606c. 10 Since article 1606c prohibits the use of such investigatory records "in evidence" upon the trial of
an action on a fire insurance policy, the court concluded that discovery of
active investigatory files of a county fire marshal was precluded.",
While the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked in a civil
proceeding," 2 the decision in Henson v. Citizens Bank of Irving"3 is an
indication that a party plaintiff in such a proceeding must be circumspect in
so doing. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of his action after he
refused to answer questions during his oral deposition on the basis of the
fifth amendment. In reversing the trial court's action, the court of civil
appeals held that rule 215a authorized dismissal of a party's suit only for
refusal to answer after being directed to do so by order of the court." 4 The
decision, however, followed rejection of the plaintiff's contention that he
had an absolute right to invoke the privilege and proceed with his action.
The court stated that the plaintiff should not be permitted to withhold
information which might relieve a defendant of liability and at the same time
5
be permitted to prosecute his claim.1
Rule 169, which governs requests for admissions of fact, provides that
104. Id. at 43.

105. Id. at 44.
106. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447d, § 3 (Vernon 1976).

107. 551 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1977).
108. Id. at 35.
109. 551 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1977).
110. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1606c (Vernon 1962).

111. 551 S.W.2d at 709.
112. See, e.g., Ex parte Butler, 522 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1975); Ex parte Stringer, 546 S.W.2d
837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
113. 549 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, no writ).
114.

Id. at 448-49; TEX. R. Civ. P. 215a.

115. 549 S.W.2d at 447.
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each of the matters for which an admission is sought shall be deemed
admitted unless, "within a period designated in the request, not less than ten
days after delivery thereof," the party to whom the request is directed
serves a sworn answer.' 16 In considering a request for admissions of fact
7
which demanded a response within ten days, the court in Taylor v. Lewis"1
held that the request was defective since the minimum time limit prescribed
by rule 169 was contravened. Thus, reasoned the court, the putative request
could not constitute a basis for deeming a fact admitted.
The amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which became
effective January 1, 1978, made several changes in the area of discovery.
The timing of interrogatory practice under rule 168 has been liberalized. The
party upon whom interrogatories have been served now has at least thirty
days after service within which to answer. Written objections to interrogatories, however, must be submitted within fifteen days after service of
the interrogatories. Rule 168 was also amended to provide that "[a]nswers to
interrogatories should, to the extent possible, be answered in spaces left
therefor following each interrogatory.""l 8 Thus, the serving party is apparently required to leave a space following each interrogatory for insertion of
the answer. Rule 178, which relates to the service of subpoenas, was
amended to provide that a subpoena may be served by a sheriff, a constable,
or "by any other person who is not a party and is not less than eighteen
years of age."" 9
IX.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment practice under rule 166-A' 20 has undergone substantial
modification as a result of the new amendments. Enlarging the former time
requirements, the amended rule provides, "[e]xcept upon leave of court, the
motion shall be served at least twenty-one days before the time specified for
hearing" and "the adverse party, not later than seven days prior to the day
of hearing, may serve opposing affidavits or other written response." Requiring greater specificity in summary judgment practice, rule 166-A now
provides that a moving party must establish that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact, and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
"on the issues expressly set out in the motion or in an answer or any other
response." Most significantly, "[i]ssues not expressly presented to the trial
court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered
on appeal as grounds for reversal." The combined effect of these two
changes apparently is to limit appellate review to the specific issues pre2
sented in the motion or response.' '
116.
117.
Shatto,
118.
119.

TEX. R. Civ. P. 169.
553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord, Bynum v.
514 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.
Id. 178.
120. Id. 166-A.
121. Whether the amendment will require a second level of pleading by the non-movant even
though the movant fails to establish his affirmative defense or negate an element of the
opposing party's cause of action is unclear. For current practice see Torres v. Western Cas. &
Sur. Co., 457 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tex. 1970); Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.
1970).
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Under the former rule expert testimony, even if uncontroverted, would
22
not establish a fact as a matter of law for purposes of summary judgment.
Modifying this principle, rule 166-A provides that "[a] summary judgment
may be based on uncontroverted testimonial evidence . . . of an expert
witness, as to subject matter concerning which the trier of fact must be
guided solely by the opinion testimony of experts" provided such "evidence
is [1] clear, positive and direct, [2] otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and [3] could have been readily controverted.1 12 3 Codifying existing case law, 124 rule 166-A stipulates that "defects in
the form of affidavits or attachments will not be grounds for reversal unless
specifically pointed out by objection by an opposing party with opportunity,
125
but refusal, to amend.'
X.

SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION

Under former practice the trial judge was required to frame his charge so
as to "not therein comment on the weight of the evidence.'1 26 This phrase
was deleted by the 1973 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 127 and the trial judge is now only prohibited from commenting "directly" on the weight of the evidence. 12 The effect of this change was considered for the first time by the supreme court in Gleghorn v. City of Wichita
Falls.129 In Gleghorn the statement of taking and the evidence in a condemnation proceeding established that the land being taken for additional flowage easement would be submerged infrequently. An instruction to the jury
that the land "is to be used" for the purpose of being submerged by water,
therefore, was found by the court to be objectionable as a direct comment
on the weight of the evidence, rather than a proper explanatory instruction. 3 ' Similarly, an instruction that the rights taken "include the right of
being submerged by water" was disapproved on the same basis.' 3'
Several decisions during the survey period focused on the scope of submission of special issues under rule 277.132 Abolishing the former requirement that special issues be submitted distinctly and separately,' 33 rule 277
now provides that "[i]t shall be discretionary with the court whether to
submit separate questions with respect to each element of a case or to
submit issues broadly," and that "[i]t shall not be objectionable that a
122. See, e.g., Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1970); Lancaster v.
Wynnewood State Bank, 470 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no writ).
123. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c). This section of rule 166-A codified the current law on the use
of testimonial evidence of an interested witness. See Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.
1972).

124. See, e.g., Texas Nat'l Corp. v. United Sys. Int'l, Inc., 493 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1973);
Perkins v. Crittenden, 462 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1970); Pena v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 555
S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, no writ).
125. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).

126. Tex. R. Civ. P. 272 (Vernon 1967).
127. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272; see Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 36 TEX. B.J. 495 (1973).
128. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
129. 545 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1977), refusing application for writ of error n.r.e. 531 S.W.2d 879
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975).
130. 545 S.W.2d at 447-48.
131. Id. at 448.
132. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.

133. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (Vernon 1967). See generally Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., I I I Tex.
461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922).
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question is general or includes a combination of elements or issues."' 34
Giving this language full effect, the Amarillo court of civil appeals in Lee v.
Andrews' approved the submission of negligence in a single issue inquiring
whether the defendant doctor "was negligent in his diagnosis and/or medical
care or treatment" of the plaintiff. 36 Similarly, in City of Baytown v.
Townsend 37 the Houston court of civil appeals endorsed the submission of

negligence in an issue inquiring "[w]hose negligence, if any, do you find
. . . proximately caused the incident made the basis of this suit" and38
followed by three possible answers: the defendant, the plaintiff, or both. 1
Finally, in a suit for breach of contract, the court in Jon-T Farms, Inc. v.
Goodpasture, Inc. 139 found no error in submitting the cause of action in an
issue inquiring whether the defendant did "breach and/or repudiate Contract
No. 16,811."14

In contrast to this wave of courts of civil appeals' decisions is the supreme
court's opinion in Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway. 141 The
trial court in this case had submitted the issue of negligence broadly by

inquiring whether "on the occasion in question the [defendant] railroad was
negligent.' 1 42 Finding that some of the pleaded acts of negligence were
unsupported by the evidence and that the record contained evidence of
other possible negligent acts which were not pleaded, the supreme court

ruled that "failure to limit the broad ultimate fact issue to acts which were
raised by both pleadings and proof violates rule 277."

143

The court stated

that compliance with the rule could be accomplished by listing the relevant
acts or omissions in a broad issue, in a checklist form, or in a complementary instruction.'" With respect to the latter method, however, the court
disapproved a suggested instruction which would have informed the jury
members that they could "consider only those acts
which are both alleged in
45

the pleading and supported by the evidence.'1
As a further qualification to the trial court's discretion in electing between
the submission of a broad issue or the submission of separate issues on each
alleged act of negligence, Burke Wiley, Inc. v. Lenderman'" is a warning
that the treatment selected by the trial court must be uniformly applied to

134. See Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict System for Texas, 27
Sw. L.J. 577 (1973).
135. 545 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ granted); see Mobil Chem. Co. v.
Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974); Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Muckleroy, 523 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
136. 545-SW.V.2d at 247.
137. 548 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
138. Id. at 940.
139. 554 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
140. Id. at 750-51.
141. 21 Sup. Ct. J. 126 (Jan. 7, 1978), aff'g 551 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1977).
142. 21 Sup. Ct. J. at 127 n.2.
143. Id. at 128. The court distinguished Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Muckleroy, 523 S.W.2d
77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), on the basis that the Muckleroy
case had some evidence in support of all of the alleged acts of negligence. 21 Sup. Ct. J. at 127.
144. 21 Sup. Ct. J. at 128-29.
145. Id. at 128. The court also held that an "Act of God" defense should be submitted in the
form of an explanatory instruction following the definitions of "negligence" and "cause in
whole or in part." Id. at 130.
146. 545 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the issues of all parties. Reversing a judgment based on a verdict where the
issue treatment was disparate, the court held that "[s]ince the court elected
to submit a special issue on each of the several acts of alleged negligence,
the defendant was entitled to a special issue on each act of contributory
negligence." 147
The propriety of the "dynamite" charge was considered by the supreme
court in Stevens v. Travelers Insurance Co. 148 With respect to "verdicturging" instructions in general the court concluded that even though a latent
danger of coercion exists, they are "not, in and of themselves, erroneous, so
long as the particular charge given is not otherwise objectionable."' 49 In
determining whether the particular charge is objectionable, the court
stressed that the context and time frame in which the instruction is given will
be as important as -the words used in such instruction. Further, the charge
must be broken down into its several particulars in order to analyze its
coercive effect. An individual statement, however, will not invalidate the
charge unless the coercive nature of the statement remains after the charge
is read as a whole. Applying the above analysis to the case at hand, the court
broke the charge down into five parts: (1) a statement that "this case has
been ably tried by lawyers, experienced, of long standing, and in the interest
of justice if you could end this litigation by your verdict, you should do
so,"' 15 (2) a statement that advised the jury that "ending the case will meet
with the approval of the court,' 151 (3) an admonition regarding the jurors'
beliefs, convictions, and pride of opinion, 52 (4) a statement regarding the
cost to the taxpayers of the county to have the particular case tried,' and
(5) a statement informing the jurors that the trial judge could not accept a
report that they could not arrive at an agreement.154 Only the second statement was found to be coercive, and upon analyzing the charge as a whole,
the court concluded that the statement's impact was mitigated by the trial
judge's cautioning the jury not to forsake their personal convictions.'
Based on this reasoning, the supreme court held that the charge was not
improperly coercive.
With respect to preserving error in the charge, ClarostatManufacturing,
Inc. v. Alcor Aviation, Inc. 156 is authority for the proposition that "the
147. Id. at 227-28.
148. 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 211 (Feb. 18, 1978).
149. Id. at 214.
150. Id. at 215.

151. Id.
152. The trial judge stated:
I don't mean to say by that that any individual person on the jury should yield his
own conscience and positive conviction, but I do mean that when you are in the
jury room, you should discuss this matter among yourselves carefully and listen
to each other, and try, if you can, to reach a conclusion on the issues. It is the duty
of jurors to keep their minds open and free and to every reasonable argument that
may be presented by fellow jurors that they may arrive at the verdict which justly
answers the consciences of the individuals making up the jury. A juryman should
not have any pride of opinion, and should avoid hastily forming or expressing an
opinion. He should not surrender any conscientious views founded upon the
evidence unless convinced by his fellow jurors of his error.
Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 216.
155. Id.
156. 544 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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tender of an omitted issue is sufficient to call the trial court's attention to the
omission, even when the omitted issue is one relied upon by the opponent of
the party making the request for submission.' 5 7 Templeton v. Unigard
Security Insurance Co. 158points out the risk of combining requested submissions to the jury with objections to the charge. Noting that the plaintiff
failed to submit his requests separately from his objections to the charge,
the court concluded that such action was not in compliance with rule 2731 9
and precluded appellate review of any points raised by the requests.160
XI.

JURY PRACTICE

Rule. 265, 61 which concerns the order of proceedings in a trial by jury, was
amended to eliminate the reading of pleadings to the jury in an opening
statement. Instead, the opening statement of counsel should now consist of
a brief explanation of "the nature of his claim or defense and what said
party expects to prove and the relief sought."
XII.

JUDGMENT

Finding that rule 81162 lodges discretion in a plaintiff as to the filing of an
answer to a counterclaim, two cases 63 during the survey period held that a
default judgment could not be taken on a counterclaim where no answer was
filed, particularly when the counterclaim arises out of the same transaction
as the plaintiff's action.
In order to keep pace with rising interest rates, article 5069 was amended
in 1975 to provide that "[a]ll judgments of the courts of this State shall bear
interest at the rate of nine percent per annum from and after the date of the
judgment."' 64 Faced with a judgment entered prior to the amendment of
article 5069 but reformed on appeal after the amendment, the supreme court
found the lower interest rate applicable for the reason that "when the trial
court's judgment is erroneous, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals
must take its place and plaintiff is entitled to interest from the date of the
65
erroneous judgment.'
XIII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The new amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which
became effective January 1, 1978, made sweeping changes in the procedure
governing a motion for new trial. Aimed at eliminating pitfalls for the
unwary in the preservation of appellate points, rule 324166 now provides that
157. Id. at 795. Rule 279 provides, however, that an objection alone to such an omission will
suffice ifthe issue isone relied upon by the opposing party. TEX. R. Civ. P. 279.
158. 550 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1976); accord, Brannon v. Gulf States Energy Corp., 548 S.W.2d
790, 795-96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ granted).
159. TEX. R. Civ. P. 273.
160. 550 S.W.2d at 269.
161. TEX. R. Civ. P. 265.
162. Id. 81.
163. McDade v.Sams, 545 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, no writ);
Benjamin v. Sawyer, 542 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
164. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
165. Herron v. Lackey, 556 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1977) (per curiam); see Sammons Enterprises,
Inc. v. Manley, 554 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ granted).

166. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324; see id. 329b; Tex. R. Civ. P. 323, 324 (Vernon 1977).
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"[a] motion for new trial shall not be a prerequisite to the right to complain
on appeal, in any jury or non-jury case." Moreover, if a motion for new trial
is filed, "the omission of a point in such motion shall not preclude the right
to make the complaint on appeal." Under amended rule 324 the only time a
motion for new trial is required as a predicate to raising a point on appeal is
when "a complaint. . . has not otherwise been ruled upon," as in the case
of jury misconduct, newly discovered evidence, or the setting aside of a
default judgment. On the other hand, "[a] complaint that one or more of a
jury's findings have insufficient support in the evidence, or are against the
overwhelming preponderance of the evidence as a matter of fact, may be
presented for the first time on appeal." The language under the former rule
which seemed to require a formal bill of exceptions in support of crosspoints has been eliminated.' 67 With respect to case law in this area, Thomas
v. Davis16 is an indication that the overruling of an untimely motion for new
trial before the trial court loses jurisdiction of the case cannot serve as a
basis for appellate review or for extending the time for taking an appeal.
Similarly, under the holding in Risher v. Risher,' 69 an order setting aside a
denial of a timely motion for new trial did not extend the time for filing an
amended motion, and the time for taking an appeal commenced to run on the
date the original motion was overruled.
XIV.

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

70

Rule 21c' was intended to liberalize the requirements for obtaining
extensions of time on appeal.' 7 ' The rule provided:
The failure of a party to timely file a transcript, statement of facts,
motion for rehearing in the court of civil appeals or application for writ
of error, will not authorize a dismissal or loss of the appeal if the
defaulting party files a motion reasonably explaining such failure in the
court where jurisdiction to make the next ruling in the case would be
affected by such failure.172
The "reasonable explanation" requirement of rule 21c, which has been the
subject of two divergent views, 73 was authoritatively construed by the
supreme court in Meshwert v. Meshwert.'74 "Reasonably explaining," according to the court, means "any plausible statement of circumstances
167. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 324 with Tex* R. Civ. P. 324 (Vernon 1977).
168. 553 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. 1977) (per curiam).
169. 547 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ dism'd).

170. Tex. R. Civ. P. 21c (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
171. See Figari, Texas Civil Procedure,Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 293, 309-

10 (1976).
172. Tex. R. Civ. P. 21c (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) (emphasis added).
173. Compare Cinemas Southwest, Inc. v. Jeffries, 550 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1977, no writ), United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Stricklin, 547 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ), Hildyard v. Fannel Studio, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), Meshwert v. Meshwert, 543 S.W.2d 877 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976), aff'd, 549 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1977), Gallegos v. Truck Ins. Exch.,
539 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ), Mulloy v. Mulloy, 538 S.W.2d
818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Stieler v. Stieler, 537
S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), with City of Wichita Falls v.
Hollis, 539 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Sloan v.
Passman, 536 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (2-1 decision).
174. 549 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1977).
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indicating that failure to file within the sixty-day period was not deliberate or
'
intentional, but was the result of inadvertance, mistake or mischance." 175
176
Hinson
v.
Also considering former rule 21c, the court in Hutcheson
concluded that the grounds asserted in a motion for extension of time must
be proved by affidavit or some other form of evidence that can be considered by an appellate court. 177 While recently the subject of extensive
modification, rule 2 1C1 78 continues to utilize the "reasonably explaining"

standard, but now provides that a motion for extension of time to file a
transcript, statement of facts, or motion for rehearing is to be submitted to
the court of civil appeals. A motion for late filing of an application for writ
of error, however, is to be submitted for ruling to the supreme court, with a
copy to the court of civil appeals.

Additional amendments, aimed at streamlining the appellate process,
were made to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 376179 now provides
that the clerk of the trial court shall, "[u]pon the filing of the cost bond or
deposit," automatically prepare a true copy of the proceedings in the trial
court for transmission to the appellate court. As a result the appellant is no
longer required to designate matters to be contained in the transcript or to
inform the appellee of the matters designated.
The rule' 0° governing the contents of the briefs submitted to the courts of
civil appeals has been revised in several respects. First, "[a] complete list of
the names of all parties shall be listed on the first page of appellant's brief,
so that the members of the court may at once determine whether they are
disqualified to serve or should recuse themselves from participation in the
decision of the case." Additionally, "[tihe brief shall contain a subject index
with page references where the discussion of each point relied upon may be
found and also a list of authorities alphabetically arranged, together with
reference to the pages of the brief where the same are cited." Significantly,
a statement of the points upon which the appeal is predicated "will be
sufficient if they direct the attention of the court to the error relied upon."
However, "[in parenthesis after each point, reference shall be made to the
page of the record above the matter complained of is to be found." In
concluding the brief, the nature of the relief sought should be clearly stated
in the prayer.
Similarly, the requisites of an application for a writ of error addressed to
the supreme court have been changed. Rule 46911 now requires a list of all
parties to be included as the first page of an application in order for the
members of the court to determine whether they should be disqualified. An
alphabetically arranged list of authorities and a brief general statement of
the nature of the suit is also required. With respect to points of error,
reference in parentheses to the page of the record where the matter com175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 384.
543 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 720.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c.
Id. 376.
Id. 418.
Id. 469.
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plained of is located should follow each point. As regards the prayer, the
nature of the relief sought in the application should be clearly set forth.
Article 2324182 authorizes the court reporter to make a transcript and to
receive "as compensation therefor a reasonable amount, subject to the
approval of the judge of the court if objection is made thereto." Intervening
in a fiscal battle between a litigant and an official court reporter, the court in
Johnson v. Stewart 183 found article 2324 unconstitutional on the grounds that
the statute is subjective in its standards and improperly delegates the exclusive legislative function of setting compensation to the judiciary.
Finally, with respect to appellate procedure, King v. Tubb 184 is the longawaited solution to the problem facing an appellee who is seeking to perfect
a cross-appeal. Where an appellee has no mandatory steps he must take to
perfect his cross-points, the court concluded that the cross-points may be
asserted for the first time in the appellee's brief on appeal.' 85
XV.

MISCELLANEOUS

Article 2226,186 which authorizes the recovery of reasonable attorney's
fees in connection with the successful prosecution of certain types of
claims, formerly limited such recovery to instances where the creditor
"should finally obtain judgment. ' 187 Adding to an existing conflict in the
decisions of the courts of civil appeals,' 88 the court in Johnson-Walker
Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Lane Container,Inc.89 concluded that a debtor
can avoid liability for attorney's fees under article 2226 by paying the
amount of the claim after the creditor has engaged an attorney and filed suit,
provided payment is made prior to the rendition of judgment. As a result of
the recent amendment, however, the language "should finally obtain judgment" was deleted from article 2226 so that the holding in Johnson-Walker
may no longer be authoritative. 190 As a further result of this amendment,
article 2226 now permits the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees in "suits
founded on oral or written contracts," except in the case of insurance
policies. Additionally, under two other enactments,' 9' a reasonable attorney's fee is recoverable by the prevailing party in a suit for adverse posses182. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
183. 554 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
184. 551 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); see Hatchell &
Calvert, Some Problems of Supreme Court Review, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 303 (1974).
185. 551 S.W.2d at 447.
186.

TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1978).

187. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
188. Compare Boaz Well Serv., Inc. v. Carter, 437 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1969, no writ), with Villarreal v. Wennermark, 540 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1976, no writ), Lamb v. Payne, 405 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, writ dism'd),
Gulf Coast Operators, Inc. v. Fleming Oil Co., 393 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965,
no writ), and National Homes Corp. v. C.J. Bldgs., Inc., 393 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1965, writ dism'd).
189. 548 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally Huff
v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 158 Tex. 433, 312 S.W.2d 493 (1958).
190. The language of the statute now states the claimant may "recover, in addition to his
claim and costs, a reasonable amount as attorney's fees." TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226
(Vernon Supp. 1978). See generally Johnson, Article 2226 Revisited: Penetrating the Jurisdictional Labyrinth, 40 TEX. B.J. 395 (1977).
191.

TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1293b, 5523b (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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sion of realty 92 or a suit for breach of a restrictive covenant pertaining to
realty. 193
In the area of collateral estoppel by judgment Hardy v. Fleming'94 is an
indication that mutuality of parties is no longer required for application of
the doctrine. When an earlier trial of a workmen's compensation case
resulted in a finding that the plaintiff had not sustained a heart attack and the
judgment in that case had become final, collateral estoppel precluded the

relitigation of the issue and required the entry of judgment in favor of the
defendant even though the defendant was not a party to or in privity with
any party to the first case.1 95
A court of civil appeals had concluded during a previous survey period
that the Texas statute authorizing prejudgment garnishment'9 was unconstitutional as being violative of the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 97 By contrast, the constitutionality of article 4076,198
which permits postjudgment garnishment in Texas, was recently reaffirmed
by another court of civil appeals. 199 Deviating slightly from the principle that
a writ of garnishment will never lie against funds deposited with the clerk of
a court, 2°° one appellate court20 1 concluded that the exemption ceases when
the court enters a judgment ordering the distribution of the funds and
nothing remains for the clerk to do except issue the necessary payment. The
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure governing attachment,20 2 garnishment,0 3 and
sequestration 2°4 have undergone substantial revision. The effects of these
05
changes are discussed elsewhere in this Survey.
192. Id. art. 5523b, §§ 1, 2.
193. Id. art. 1293b.
194. 553 S.W,2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
195. Id. at 792-93. Considerations of due process may, however, still be applicable. See
Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1971).
196. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4084 (Vernon 1966).
197. Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ); see Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
See generally North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975), noted in 29 Sw.
L.J. 660 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
198. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4076 (Vernon 1966). See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 657-679.
199. Pitts v. Dallas Nurseries Garden Center, Inc., 545 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1976, no writ); accord, Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. First State
Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
200. See Curtis v. Ford, 78 Tex. 262, 14 S.W. 614 (1890); Pace v. Smith, 57 Tex. 555 (1882).
201. Hardy v. Construction Sys., Inc., 556 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1977, writ filed).
202. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 592-608.
203. See id. 658-664a.
204. See id. 696-712a.
205. See Dorsaneo, Creditors' Rights, p. 269 supra.

